

Ethnic identity and language policy

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One can argue that the desire to ally communicative competence and group identity lies at the heart of language planning whether it is conceived as overt policy making or develops informally in the general governance of social groups. (Wright 2004: 7)

As far back as Biblical times, ethnic identity and language have been linked. The Book of Judges relates how the defeated Ephraimites were distinguished from the triumphant Gileadites by asking them to say 'Shibboleth', since the Ephraimite dialect lacked a /ʃ/ sound. This is perhaps one of the earliest attestations of language policy, for the account reflects the different *language practices* of diverse ethnicities, as well as the *language beliefs* of the Gileadites regarding the language of the Ephraimites. The Biblical account also manifests an instance of *language management*, as language practices were used to identify and categorize ethnic difference. Wright (2004) reminds us that although the scholarly field of language policy emerged in the mid-twentieth century, language policy activities are as old as language itself and have played a 'crucial role in the distribution of power and resources in all societies' (1).

Ethnic identity has been linked to the three components that Spolsky (2004) identifies as language policy - language practices, language beliefs and language management - throughout pre-modern and modern history (Fishman 1971). This chapter will focus on studying the relationship and interaction between ethnic identity on the one hand, and the components of language policy on the other - the beliefs or ideologies about language in a speech community, their habitual language patterns, and their own or others' efforts to modify or influence their language practices - since the development, in the mid twentieth century, of the field that we know today as *language policy* (Ricento 2006, Shohamy 2006, Spolsky 2004), and sometimes as *language policy and planning* (Hornberger 2006, Wright 2004).

That ethnic identity has something to do with language policy is perhaps best manifested by the historical relationship between the ethnic revival of the mid-twentieth century (Fishman 1985), and the emergence of the field of study that was first named *language planning* (Fishman 1971, Fishman, Ferguson and Das Gupta 1968, Haugen 1959, 1966, Kaplan and Baldauf 1997). In this early period, ethnic identity and language policies were many times conflated, as people's ethnic sense of self became energized through independence of newly emerging states, and as these new nation-states grappled with decisions about language use for their future.

This chapter reviews the role that ethnic identity might have had in the ways in which language policies were initially shaped and studied as a sub-field of sociolinguistics. It traces how ethnic identity and language policy have been understood throughout history. The chapter also describes how ethnic identity is being shaped by today's globalization and new technologies, and how these newly emerging conceptualizations of identity are impacting on language policy decisions and on the field itself. Finally, the chapter proposes a theoretical framework to study the constructive interaction between ethnic identity and language policy. Principles governing the interaction between ethnic identity and language policy are presented. These principles are then discussed and exemplified through four cases with different patterns of ethnic identity-language policy interaction - Luxembourgish, Māori, Tzeltal/Tsotsil and Gallo.

What is ethnic identity and how is it linked to language and language policy?

Ethnicity, for anthropologists, refers to a cluster of features or practices that are attributed in some way to a collectivity or aggregation of people, and that is often the basis for socio-cultural organization (Makihara 2010). Fishman (1989) tells us that *ethnicity* is phenomenological; that is, it is self-perceived, or it is attributed by others. Although pre-modern ethnicity was minimally self-conscious, since the sixteenth century in the Western world, ethnicity has been a highly conscious, instrumental outward-oriented ideology (Fishman 1977).

As ethnicity, *identity* is situational and contextual; that is, there is no 'true' identity, but just more effective or less effective identities, and more salient or less salient identities (Fishman 2010). Ethnic identity refers then to one kind of identity associated with a cluster of features or practices that are claimed by individuals or groups or assigned to them by other actors in a specific socio-historical, sociopolitical, and socioeconomic context. Ethnic identity can thus be a product of self-perceptions, or a

result of outsiders' perspectives and actions, whether other laypersons or more authoritative persons (Fishman 2010). Thus, ethnic identity is both a socio-psychological emotive state, as well as produced in interaction with others as it is negotiated. Furthermore, ethnic identity is impacted by local political economies. There are thus both assumed identities and imposed identities, but there are also negotiable identities (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004).

Language is then likely to be the symbol of ethnic identity 'par excellence' because language is more than symbolic of ethnic identity; language becomes the prime ethnic identity feature or practice in and of itself (Fishman 1977). In the words of Bakhtin (1986: 67-8): 'Language arises from man's need to express himself, to objectify himself ... And if language also serves as a means of communication, this is a secondary function that has nothing to do with its essence.'

It is then precisely the important role that language has played in shaping and defining ethnic identity – what Fishman (1977, 1996) has called *ethnolinguistic identity* – as well as the important role that ethnic identity has had in speech communities' language beliefs, language practices, and language management, that enables the enterprise of language policy and planning. Fishman (2010: xxxiii) summarizes this relationship, as well as the reason why language planning came into being by saying:

Languages and ethnicities are more continuous and gradual than has been initially anticipated by local politicized historiographies and ethnographies. Because the subdivision of continua is inherently perspectival, it is also inherently reversible by social planning and language planning.

For Fishman, language planning activities emerge and are made possible precisely because of the situational and contextual nature of ethnic identity and the ways in which language features and practices both symbolize and enact ethnic identity. Languages can be made to spread throughout speech communities (Fishman 1972b, 1972c) or be extinguished or 'killed' (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000) as a result of language policy. And speech communities can maintain languages, shift to others, and even reverse language shift (Fishman 1991) on account of language policy.

The variability of features inherent in language, the different ways in which language can be used at different times and with various interlocutors, as well as the various attitudes and beliefs held about language features and practices, are what makes language policy possible. Because choices must be made about all of this, either by individuals and groups themselves, or by outsiders, language policy has to be understood as a most important component of sociolinguistics.

But language choice and language beliefs are not neutral. As Pavlenko and Blackledge (2004: 1-2) propose:

[L]anguage choice and attitudes are inseparable from political arrangements, relations of power, language ideologies, and interlocutors' views of their own and others' identities. Ongoing social, economic, and political changes affect these constellations, modifying identity options offered to individuals at a given moment in history and ideologies that legitimize and value particular identities more than others.

The understanding that language practices, beliefs, and management have much to do with power and politics has led to developments of critical aspects of sociolinguistics and language policy, as we will see in the next section.

The link between ethnic identity and language policy in historical perspective

The rise of European nation-states and language policy

In pre-modern pan-Mediterranean and European thought, language and ethnic identity were viewed as naturally linked. This primordialist view became salient in the thinking of the German Romantics. For Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), 'without its own language, a Volk is an absurdity, a contradiction in terms' (Herder, as cited in Fishman 1972b: 48). This was also the position of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) who in *Reden an die Deutsche Nation* (1808) said: 'Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself ... They belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole' (quoted in Kedourie 1993: 64).

Edward Sapir (1884-1939) and his student, Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897-1941), proposed hypotheses that strengthened the link between language and ethnic identity, suggesting, in the strong version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, that individuals are at the mercy of the language they speak, and in the weaker version that an individual's way of thinking and behavior is influenced by the languages he or she speaks. But the primordialist position that language and ethnic identity were naturally linked started to be questioned in the late nineteenth century. Franz Boas (1858-1942) pointed out that historical, social and geographical experiences have created differences. And Max Weber (1864-1920) indicated that a belief in a common origin depends on 'consciousness of kind' (Weber 1978: 378).

In Europe the link between ethnic identity and language was made stronger by nationalist movements throughout the nineteenth century that sought to differentiate a chosen national language from other varieties and to achieve linguistic homogeneity within the group (Wright 2004). The new states that were formed after the dismantling of the

Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires at the end of the First World War established borders that created separate national identities that attempted to correspond to a 'national language.' During this time, language policy was both planned and unplanned, 'the side effect of other nation-building strategies' (Wright 2004: 41).

Dissolution of colonial empires and the rise of language policy as a field

The dissolution of the European colonial empires in Africa and Asia coincided with the birth of sociolinguistics and the language policy field. Africa was carved up according to the power interests of European states. And in these new African states relationships, between ethnic identity and language practices were ignored. The result was a highly linguistically heterogeneous population. The multilingualism of newly independent African and Asian countries was thought to work against economic development and education. The emerging field of sociolinguistics was put in the service of solving the language 'problems' of the newly independent states by assessing the situation and prescribing certain changes in how language was used (Das Gupta and Ferguson 1977).

Einar Haugen (1959) is credited with having used the term *language planning* for the first time to refer to 'the activity of preparing a normative orthography, grammar, and dictionary for the guidance of writers and speakers in a non-homogeneous speech community' (8). In 1965 Joshua Fishman published his now classic article entitled 'Who Speaks What Language to Whom and When', the basis for the development of macro-sociolinguistics or Fishmanian sociolinguistics (Garca, Peltz and Schiffman 2006). Fishmanian sociolinguistics focused on the social organization of language behaviour, 'including not only language usage per se, but also language attitudes and overt behaviors *toward* language and *toward* language users' (my italics, Fishman 1972a: 1), and thus promoting social action on behalf of languages and its speakers. In 1968, Fishman, Ferguson and Das Gupta published *Language Problems of Developing Nations*, perhaps what could be considered the first text in the field of language policy. It was the 'problems' of developing nations, and specifically the fact that national identity and national language did not coincide with either ethnic identity nor language use, that in many ways fuelled the development of the field of language policy (Jernudd and Das Gupta 1971).

Fishman insists that social intervention is needed on behalf of languages and their users because 'The language symbolizes the people, it represents them, it speaks volumes for them, and if they are to be heard and heard-out, then it must speak from a position of honor and security as well' (Fishman 1996: 92). Thus, both *status planning*, as well as *corpus planning*, the 'two Siamese-twins' of language policy (Fishman 2006), are

directly related to efforts to bolster the honour and security of a people whose language and ethnic identity are one and the same.

Fishman was not the only sociolinguist to study the relationship between ethnic identity and language beliefs and practices, both unplanned and planned. Giles and Byrne (1982) developed a model of *ethnolinguistic vitality* that looked at the relationship between ethnic identity, language maintenance and shift, and second-language acquisition. Giles' ethnolinguistic vitality model considered language an important marker of ethnic identity, and took into account the status of the language, its demographic strength and its institutional support. Around the same time, Gumperz' work (1982) focused on how code-switching indexes different ethnic identities. But by conducting an ethnographic study of language use in the Caribbean, Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985) proposed that social identities were fluid and constructed in linguistic and social interaction. Acts of identity are ways in which individuals project their concepts of language and ethnic identity on others, and thus determine the nature of groups (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985). Le Page and Tabouret-Keller brought to light the fact that the relationship between ethnic identity and language policy is not straightforward or easily predicted.

Postmodern positions on ethnic identity and critical language policy

Postmodern scholarship, a result of globalization and new technologies, has pointed to the situational and subjective construction of ethnicity, shifting attention from ethnicity to more hybridized identities (Bhabha 1994) affected by new local and global identities (Canagarajah 2005). Postmodern ethnic identity involves sameness, but also, otherness, as well as the development of hybrid identities and language practices. Identity can no longer be used to solely explain linguistic practices or linguistic managing of those practices, and individuals may even construct identities by adopting linguistic practices of groups to which they do not rightly belong. For example, *code-crossing* has been identified as a way to construct different identities using language in ways that are not those of the group to which speakers belong (Rampton 1995).

Pennycook (2000, 2003) relies on the concept of *performativity* to explain that people do not use language based on their identity but, instead, perform their identity using language. Language and identity are mutually constitutive only in that language provides 'the linguistic means through which identities are constructed and negotiated' (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004: 14). Choices may be limited or not, negotiable or not, depending on particular socio-historical contexts, but individuals are agentive beings, 'constantly in search of new social and linguistic resources which allow them to resist identities that

position them in undesirable ways, produce new identities, and assign alternative meanings to the links between identities and linguistic varieties' (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004: 27). A postmodernist position rejects any intrinsic direct link between language and identity (May 2004).

The work of Makoni and Pennycook (2007) has argued that our present conception of 'language' was originally constructed by states that wanted to consolidate political power. To do so, they established language academies, encouraged the preparation of grammars, dictionaries and treatises to strengthen and standardize languages, encouraged the enumeration of languages in ways that marked their differences and similarities, and promoted our thinking of language as an autonomous skill. The same can be said of ethnic identity that has been many times created by groups, and particularly states, that are interested in political power. Speaking of the continent of Africa, Vail (1991: 12) says: 'firm, non-porous and relatively inelastic ethnic boundaries, many of which were highly arbitrary, came to be constructed and were then strengthened by the growth of stereotypes of "the other."' Rather than languages and ethnicities, what we have is 'linguaging' and 'ethnifying' (García 2010), that is, plural practices in which specific features become associated as characteristic of a speech or ethnic community either by the group itself or by others (Makoni, Makoni and Pennycook 2010).

Influenced by the work of Pierre Bourdieu, some scholars have maintained that language beliefs, language practices, and language management, are always ideological and enmeshed in social systems of domination and subordination of groups, having to do not only with ethnicity or language, but also with class and gender (see Irvine and Gal 2000, Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). Thus, language policy signals ideological positions and boundary markers of group identity for inclusion and exclusion (Kroskrity 2000a). That is, the social context can prevent individuals from accessing certain linguistic resources or practices or adopting new identities (Woolard 1998). For Heller (1987) language is an instrument of identity negotiation that facilitates or restricts access to powerful social networks.

These understandings of how power operates in language choices have led to the development of *critical language policy* studies. In criticizing the early work of language planners and policy makers, Tollefson, for example, claims that language policy is 'one mechanism by which dominant groups establish hegemony in language use' (Tollefson 1991: 16). And Pennycook (2006) says that '[l]anguage policy has to do with the use of languages as part of language *governmentality*' (64). Governmentality, as defined by Foucault (1991), refers to the operation of power at the level of diverse practices, rather than solely through regulations imposed by the state.

Power operates in practices and ideologies and beliefs, and not only in laws and regulations. Our languaging and ethnifying is more than just a way of being, it is an active way of negotiating, resisting, empowering or discriminating. It is precisely these new understandings that have expanded the field of language policy from its original conceptualization as simply 'planning' at the state level, to one that today incorporates language beliefs, practices and management actions (Spolsky 2004) not only by state government and language managers, but also by families, faith communities, employers and educators (Spolsky 2009).

Principles, framework and cases

It is clear that ethnic identities and language policies have something to do with each other. Before we examine more closely the relationship between the two, it is important to summarize here the six principles about the nature of *ethnic identity* that have been derived from the foregoing discussion and that are important to keep in mind as we explore further the relationship between ethnic identity and language policy:

- 1 Ethnic identity develops out of consciousness and often in competition with other ethnic identities.
- 2 Ethnic identity develops alongside other identities. Language identity is just one of those identities. Thus, ethnolinguistic identity is one component of ethnic identity.
- 3 Ethnic identity and an ethnolinguistic identity can be self-ascribed (assumed) or it can be imposed externally (imposed) by either other citizens or authoritative agents.
- 4 Ethnic identity and an ethnolinguistic identity can be negotiated and performed.
- 5 The negotiation and performance of ethnic/ethnolinguistic identity is always impacted by socio-political and socio-economic arrangements.
- 6 Ethnic identity/ethnolinguistic identity is not always about sameness; it can also be about otherness, and include hybrid ethnic identities.

How then does ethnic identity relate to language policy? Figure 5.1 lays out such a relationship.

First of all, both the way we ethnify, as well as the way we language, are influenced by the political economy of the contexts - global, national and local - in which we perform our acts of identity. The political economy also relates to the language ideologies that circulate in the socio-political and socioeconomic contexts. All components of the model are then interrelated. That is, the ways in which we ethnify, our beliefs about languaging, our languaging (both in private and public domains) and the ways in which our languaging is managed, are dynamically engaged with each other. And within each component, ethnifying and

POLITICAL ECONOMY
Global
National
Local



LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES
Global
National
Local



ETHNIC IDENTITY	LANGUAGE POLICY			
	Beliefs about language practices	Habitual pattern of selecting among varieties	Habitual pattern of selecting among varieties	Efforts to modify or influence language practice by language intervention, planning or management
Ethnic Identity	Language ideologies	Language practices (Languaging in private)	Language practices (Languaging in public)	Management of language practices
Strong.....Weak	Strong.....Weak	Strong.....Weak	Strong.....Weak	Strong.....Weak
Self	Self	Self	Self	Self (In-group)
Others Lay people Authorities	Others Lay people Authorities			Others (Out-group) Lay people Authorities
<p>DYNAMIC INTERACTION</p>				

Figure 5.1 Ethnic identity and language policy theoretical framework

linguaging has as much to do with self-definitions and self-evaluations, as it has to do with the considerations of others, both other laypersons with whom we interact, as well as authoritative managers, for example, linguists and governmental officials. The model is then dynamic, as each component interacts and engages with the other.

De Bot, Lowie and Verspoor (2007) have pointed out how internal ecosystems interact dynamically with external social ecosystems. Ethnifying and languaging are both internal sociopsychological states, as well as sociopolitical and socioeconomic actions that are dynamically related. As ethnifying and languaging change internally and externally to adapt to the political economy and the language ideologies of the social context, the language policy is also altered. Each act of ethnifying and languaging changes the system and the relationships of the components, just as the language policy itself alters the possibilities and enactments of ethnifying and languaging of what is either self-ascribed or considered by others to be a 'speech community'.

The remainder of this chapter considers a central principle of the relationship of ethnic identity and language policy, as well as three corollaries, in light of different cases. The central principle is simply this:

- A strong link between ethnic identity and language identity; that is, a strong ethnolinguistic identity, is a necessary pre-requisite for language policies to support the efforts of an ethnic community that performs its identity languaging in certain ways.

But this link is insufficient if the group does not have, nor is it supported by external authoritative powers whose language ideologies facilitate, rather than disrupt, the language practices of the speech community, and that develop favourable language managing arrangements.

The three corollaries are these:

- 1 In today's globalized world, ethnic identity is mostly performed through a *multiplicity* of ways of languaging, rather than just through one 'authoritative language'. Thus, bi/plurilingualism and the languaging that results from greater language contact are most important components of an ethnolinguistic identity.
- 2 In today's globalized world, a strong ethnolinguistic identity can only be supported through language management efforts that are aligned with language practices and attitudes that give access to the political economy of the sociopolitical and socioeconomic context. In cases where this is not so, then only language policies that support bi/plurilingual/hybrid ethnolinguistic identities can be successful.
- 3 The link between ethnic identity and language identity can exist *a priori*, but it can also be the result of policy, and specifically of authoritative language management which targets simultaneously both the corpus and the status of the language, and is often promoted through education.

To illustrate how these principles work, Table 5.1 provides a categorization of cases where the ethnolinguistic identity of the group is strong to moderate, but the success of the language policy to support the negotiation and performance of these ethnolinguistic identities varies because of different language managing efforts. Thus, the sociolinguistic results are different. Four patterns of interaction between ethnic identity and language policy are identified. The cases in the two left-hand columns of the table can be considered successful in that the existing language policy is strengthening a plurilingual ethnolinguistic identity and thus resulting in language development, either of the maintenance kind or the revitalization kind. However, the cases in the two columns to the right are less successful. That is, despite strong to moderate ethnolinguistic identities, weak language management by the group itself, as well as that of others – a result of domination, exploitation and subordination by more powerful groups – continuously threatens their ethnolinguistic identity. The prospects for these languages are then poor, resulting in threatened languages, and the progressive advancement toward language shift (for a treatment of the successes and failures of ethnic identity and language, see Fishman and García 2011).

Table 5.1 *Graded components of ethnolinguistic identity and language policy*

	SUCCESSFUL LP EFFORTS		LESS SUCCESSFUL LP EFFORTS	
Ethnolinguistic identity	Strong	Strong	Strong	Moderate
Beliefs about languaging	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Weak
Languaging in private	Strong	Moderate	Strong	Weak
Languaging in public	Strong	Moderate	Weak	Weak
Language management by in-group	Strong	Strong	Weak	Weak
Language management by out-group	Strong	Strong	Weak	Weak
Example of groups	Lmbyrgns Basques Catalans	Māoris Welsh	Tseltals/ Tsotils Quechuas Amazigh-speakers (Berbers) Alsatian	Gallo-speakers Breton-speakers Dinés
RESULTS	Language maintenance & development	Language revitalization & development	Language threatened	Language shift

As Table 5.1 indicates, the defining component of language policy to support a group's ethnolinguistic identity is language management itself. That is, a group can have very strong language management that they associate with their identity in private, and yet fail in their efforts to achieve some measure of socio-political and socio-economic success as an ethnolinguistic group. As a result, their language identity is threatened and they experience much linguistic insecurity. This is the case of the groups that have been conquered or subjugated – the third column in the Table 5.1 – where the pattern of interaction between ethnic identity and language policy results in less success. For example, the Tsel'tals and Tsotsils who speak the two most numerous Mayan languages in Chiapas, Mexico (García and Velasco 2012), and the Quechuas of Peru and Bolivia (Coronel-Molina 2011, Luykx 2011) have a strong ethnolinguistic identity and also strong language management in their indigenous languages, and yet their languages are threatened. We will discuss below the case of the Tsel'tals and Tsotsils to exemplify this less successful pattern. Beyond Latin America, the Amazighs of the Maghreb offer another example of this less successful pattern of interaction between ethnic identity and language policy. Berber ethnolinguistic identity is tied to Amazigh and is extremely strong, but an Amazigh ethnolinguistic identity is continuously threatened by the diglossic relationship of Arabic, with Classical Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic, and Moroccan Arabic occupying positions of strength, while keeping Amazigh language practices and identity in an inferior position through language management measures. The result is a feeling of threat and much language insecurity, and a continuous shift away from Amazigh (Ennaji 2011, Sadiki 2011). The same pattern of ethnolinguistic identity-language policy is observed in Alsace, France. Alsatian ethnolinguistic identity remains strong, despite a history of having been occupied by Germany twice, and being part of a country with a strong monolingual policy and little support for languages other than French (Hélot and Young 2006). Although there has been a massive shift to French, a quarter of Alsatian families are still passing on Alsatian, a Germanic language, to their children who are also speakers of French (Ager 1999).

Mainly as a result of extreme negative language management decisions by out-groups – what Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) would call *linguistic genocide* – some groups are farther along the language shift continuum than others. This negative pattern of interaction between ethnic identity and language policy is represented in the final column of Table 5.1 and results in even less success than in the cases in the third column. For example, the Diné (Navajos) have undergone more language shift than the Tsel'tals or Tsotsils, or the Quechuas, or the Amazigh people, or the Alsatians. But this has little to do with the strength or not of their ethnolinguistic identities, but rather with the political economy of the context in which they live. As we will see, in the case

of the Tzeltal and Tsotsil, their language practices have been protected because of the nature of the Spanish conquest and their isolated geographic location in Chiapas. On the other hand, the Diné (Navajos) not only were decimated by US policies of eradication of the indigenous population, but they encountered a major national power, the United States. As McCarty has often indicated (see, for example, McCarty and Zepeda 2010), these policies have been responsible for the language shift to English of most Native Americans, and the linguistic insecurity of those who still speak the indigenous languages. This has resulted in a weaker ethnolinguistic identity that can only be categorized as moderate, and in extensive language shift. Even speakers of European languages cannot endure the onslaught of language management decisions that threaten their existence. This is the case, for example, of the two languages of Brittany, France – Breton and Gallo (Hornsby and Nolan 2011). Over a decade ago, Ager (1999) had declared that Breton, the Celtic language of Brittany, had ‘practically disappeared among those under thirty’ (1999: 36). And Gallo, a Romance language, is threatened even further (Hornsby and Nolan 2011), as our discussion below will make clear.

In the case of groups that have undergone language shift, only strong language management decisions can result in reversing language shift (Fishman 1991). Columns 2 and 3 in Table 5.1 lay out the positive pattern of interaction between ethnic identity and language policy that results in some measure of success. It is precisely, as we will see below, the very strong language management policies of the Māoris that have resulted in their language revitalization, alongside their increased participation in the political economy of New Zealand. Although as a result of incomplete language revitalization the Māoris may only have moderate language practices in private and public, their ethnolinguistic identities are being affirmed as a result of language management decisions that have had an impact on their more extended language practices, as well as on their increasing pride in being Māori (May 2010). The case of the Welsh is similar to that of the Māoris in the sense that a strong ethnolinguistic identity, coupled with strong language management, the result of more authority and empowerment, has led to a successful reversal in language practices, with people’s languaging both in private and public coming back from a weak position to a more moderate one (Jones and Martin-Jones 2004).

Only in situations where the ethnolinguistic groups have acquired authoritative power is there a match between the three components of language policy – the beliefs, the languaging, and the management about languaging. Greater success then is reserved for those ethnolinguistic groups whose strong ethnolinguistic identities match their ability to enact language policies that support their strong beliefs on behalf of their languaging, as well as their strong languaging both in private

and public. The Luxembourgiens, the Basques and the Catalans are good examples of this type of case. I will use the example of Luxembourg to illustrate a successful language policy that results in language maintenance and development of Luxembourgish.

Four cases will exemplify each of the four different patterns of interaction between ethnic identity and language policy and the resulting prospect for the language:

- 1 *The case of Luxembourgish: Language maintenance and development*
 - Strong ethnolinguistic identity, language beliefs, language practices and language management
- 2 *The case of Māori: Language revitalization and development*
 - Strong ethnolinguistic identity, language beliefs and language management. Moderate language practices
- 3 *The case of Tse'etal and Tsotsil: Language under threat*
 - Strong ethnolinguistic identity and language practices in private. Moderate language beliefs. Weak language practices in public and weak language management
- 4 *The case of Gallo: Language shift*
 - Moderate ethnolinguistic identity. Weak language beliefs, language practices and language management

The case of Luxembourgish: language maintenance and development

The Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg was established in 1839. The peasant population at the time spoke a Germanic language, named West-Moselle-Franconian by dialectologists. But the German occupation of 1914 and the incorporation of Luxembourg into the Third Reich during the Nazi period, motivated people to start separating Luxembourgish, at least in their consciousness, as a language separate from German, in what Kloss (1967a) would have termed an instance of *ausbau*. This affirmation of a very strong Luxembourgish ethnolinguistic identity as resistance to Nazi rule is recounted by Homer and Weber (2008: 74):

In October 1941, a census was administered, including questions on *jetzige Staatsangehörigkeit* 'current citizenship', *Muttersprache* 'mother tongue', and *Volkszugehörigkeit* 'ethnicity'. Many people answered these three questions with *Lëtzebuergesch*, thus symbolically resisting incorporation into the Third Reich. This rebellion against Nazi authority is referred to today as *driäimol Lëtzebuergesch* 'three times Luxembourgish.'

Thus the link between national identity, national language and resistance to Nazi German became sealed, providing Luxembourg and Luxembourgish not only with a separate ethnolinguistic identity, but

also with international recognition and support as a country that stood up to Nazi Germany.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the international banking economy expanded and Luxembourg became the second largest investment fund centre in the world. Furthermore, Luxembourg became a most important European Union capital, home to the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the European Investment Bank, the Publications Office, the General Secretariat of the European Parliament and the General Directorate of the European Commission (Homer and Weber 2008). The foreign population grew, as well as the population of *frontaliers*, those who cross the borders of Belgium, France and Germany every day to work in Luxembourg. Although Luxembourgish had a safe position, French started to be used at home by a larger sector than before. Furthermore, it is French or German that is mostly used in writing. It started to appear that additional language management efforts were needed.

In 1971 the association *Actioun Lëtzebuergesch* was founded, dedicated to promoting further the use of Luxembourgish. Finally, in 1984 a law was passed declaring Luxembourgish the national language. But this law also declared that French, German and Luxembourgish were to be accepted as languages of administration and justice, and French would be the language of legislation (Ehrhart and Fehlen 2011, Homer and Weber 2008).

The link between Luxembourgish and national identity has become salient in the last two decades, with symbols being created and protected. For example, in 1993, the national anthem (*Ons Heemecht* 'Our Homeland') received legal protection. In 1999, the *Conseil permanent de la langue luxembourgeoise* (CPLL) was created to protect the Luxembourgish language. Its first task was to create and implement the 1999 spelling reform, since Luxembourgish is increasingly being used in writing as a way to create greater distance from German (Homer and Weber 2008). In 2001, the amendments to the 'law on Luxembourgish nationality' introduced a language clause that stipulated that a 'basic knowledge' of Luxembourgish was needed for naturalization (Homer and Weber 2008).

Today the Luxembourgish school system uses Luxembourgish, German and French. In early childhood classrooms, children and teachers interact in Luxembourgish. But in the early grades of primary school, reading and writing are taught in German only. Although the teaching language is supposed to be German, much Luxembourgish is used (personal observation, January 2009). During the second half of the second grade of primary school, when children are approximately eight years old, French is taught, and used increasingly in instruction. High school is divided into *lycée classique* or *lycée technique*. In the more academic *lycée classique*, the subjects are taught through German and French, with the exception of the Luxembourgish lesson, as well as its use in subjects such as Physical Education. Although in the early years of *lycée classique* German is used predominantly as the language of instruction, in the last two

years, French is primarily used. The official policy excludes the use of Luxembourgish in the *lycée classique*, although as Fehlen (2007, cited in Ehrhart and Fehlen 2011) has pointed out, Luxembourgish has entered the classrooms 'through the back door', and *translangaging*, the multiple discursive practices that teachers and students use in order to make sense of instruction in bilingual and multilingual classrooms (García 2009) is used extensively (personal observation, January 2009). In the *lycée technique*, most subjects are taught through German and the use of Luxembourgish is frequent (Homer and Weber 2008).

Today, Luxembourgish is a first language to 57 per cent of the population (Fehlen 2009). Only 3 per cent of residents of Luxembourg are monolingual, and 30 per cent of the residents are foreigners. Furthermore, 40 per cent of the population are *frontaliers* (Fehlen 2009). Fehlen and Giles (2009) have observed that Luxembourgish is safe since it is being intergenerationally transmitted, and plurilingualism is part of the country's tradition. It is important to note that it is plurilingualism itself, as well as the non-diglossic relationship of Luxembourgish to French and German, which has preserved Luxembourgish as a developing and dominant language and has affirmed a Luxembourgish ethnolinguistic identity.

The case of Māori: Language revitalization and development

When the British settled Aotearoa/New Zealand in the late eighteenth century, they encountered the Māoris, indigenous inhabitants who had settled in the islands 500 to a 1,000 years before. In 1840 the British Crown and the Māori chiefs signed the Treaty of Waitangi. In return for giving up sovereignty, Māoris received guarantee of 'their lands, their homes and all their treasured possessions (*taonga*)' (cited in May 2010: 502). However, Māori lands were taken over illegally, and the Māori people endured abysmal poverty and educational failure (May 2004).

In the 1970s Māori activists started to argue for the recognition of their separate culture and language. Fueled by the movement on the rights of indigenous peoples (Kymlicka 1995, May 2001, 2004), the Waitangi Tribunal was set up in 1975 to settle Māori claims against the Crown. One of the claims was that the English-speaking school system was decimating the Māori language. In 1986 the Tribunal ruled that *te reo Māori*, the Māori language, was a *taonga* (treasured possession) that was *guaranteed* under the Treaty of Waitangi. In 1987 the Māori Language Act recognized Māori as an official language of Aotearoa/New Zealand. The Act also provided for the establishment of a Māori Language Commission to promote the use of the language (May 2010).

In the early 1980s, Māori parents started preschool immersion programmes in Māori. These *kōhanga reo* were followed by the *kura kaupapa Māori* (literally, Māori philosophy schools) in 1985 which rapidly spread in the 1990s (May 2010).

In speaking about Māori language policy and its relationship to Māori ethnolinguistic identity, May (2010: 506) summarizes:

The gains made by Māori in language education and wider public policy over the last 30 years have been based on the central notion of self-determination (*tino rangatiratanga*) and a distinctive Māori indigenous identity. In this respect, current Māori identity has inevitably been constructed out of colonialism and a symbiotic interaction with Pākehā. Māori may thus be said to have drawn on shared historical memories, myths of common ancestry, and a growing sense of solidarity (Smith 1991), in order to develop a common ethnic and cultural parlance in the face of a colonizing power ... The politicization of Māori ethnicity then can perhaps be best described by the aphorism 'old symbols, new meanings'. ... This process has also inevitably involved the (re)mobilization and (re)articulation of Māori identities – in a dynamic and changing combination of traditional, new and hybrid forms – as a basis for their claims to greater self-determination.

May (2010) argues further that policies on behalf of Māori are strongly linked to a sense of biculturalism and bilingualism and to a negation of a multicultural and multilingual New Zealand that would then recognize the identities of the Pasifika – migrants from the principal Pacific islands of Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Tuvalu and Fiji – and would weaken their claim for entitlement of protective language policies.

In the 2006 Census, 24 per cent of Māoris identified themselves as being speakers of the language, an indication of the success of the language policies on their behalf (Ministry of Education 2007, cited in May 2010). Yet in 2001, the *National Māori Language Survey* had found that 58 per cent of Māori adults could not speak Māori beyond a 'few words or phrases' (cited in May 2010: 505). Thus, although the case of the Māoris points to a successful reversal of their pattern of language shift and further developments on behalf of their ethnolinguistic identity and practices, full success in language revitalization would require sustained effort. Māori revitalization has been more successful than that of others because they have achieved some measure of self-determination, while increasing their access to the political economy of New Zealand, as well as to quality education. But it is important to point out that the success of Māori efforts is based on a Māori plurilinguism that includes English, as well as hybrid forms of Māori ethnolinguistic identities and language practices.

The case of Tseltal and Tsotsil: language under threat

Of all speakers of Mayan languages, 60 per cent reside in Chiapas, the southernmost state of Mexico, near the border with Guatemala. Almost 40 per cent of the population in Chiapas speaks one of twelve indigenous

languages (INEGI 2005), the most common Mayan languages being *Tzeltal* (*k'op o wriuk atel*) and *Tsotsil* (*batsil k'op*) both mutually intelligible (García and Velasco 2012). Only 63 per cent of the Chiapas indigenous population is bilingual, with over one-third speaking only an indigenous language (Schmal 2004).

Chiapas is the poorest state in Mexico. About 90 per cent of the homes in which the 1.2 million indigenous people reside do not have drinkable water (García and Velasco 2012). Until the end of the twentieth century, indigenous children in rural areas did not have schools. When there were schools, education was solely in Spanish and monolingual indigenous children were often ignored by teachers with little understanding of their cultural and linguistic needs. Children often dropped out of school by the end of the first grade (García and Velasco 2012).

On 1 January 1994, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) led a revolt against the Mexican government in Chiapas. The revolt coincided with the day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was to take effect. The Zapatistas rose up against neo-liberal policies that ignored the social needs of the indigenous population. The demands included the right for all to 'jobs, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, and justice and peace' (Russell 1995: 36). On 16 February 1996, the San Andrés Accords were signed between the Zapatista movement and the government of Mexico. Representatives of all indigenous communities broadly discussed the Accords, and they were translated into ten indigenous languages. The agreements approved indigenous autonomy over local governments, as well as over natural resources. Besides an inclusive agrarian policy, the linguistic, cultural and ethnic pluralism of Mexico and Chiapas were recognized. The Accords led to changes in the Mexican constitution, granting more rights and privileges to indigenous peoples. Although the government subsequently ignored the Accords, the dialogue that it promoted raised the level of social consciousness in both indigenous and non-indigenous communities (García and Velasco 2012).

The Mexican state has been moving slowly towards recognition of its indigenous population, a reversal of former Mexican language policies that insisted on the linguistic assimilation of the indigenous population (Hamel 2008b, Heath 1972, Stavenhagen 1979). Article 2 of the present Mexican constitution (*Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, 1995-2009) affirmed the pluricultural nature of the Mexican state and recognized the original indigenous population. In March 2003, the *Ley General de Derechos Lingüísticos de los Pueblos Indígenas* declared Spanish and sixty-three Indigenous languages as 'national languages' because of their 'historical origin', and declared them to have the same value in 'the territory, location and context in which they're spoken'. Article 11 of the cited legislation declared that all indigenous children must have access to compulsory intercultural bilingual education during

the initial years of schooling. In addition, the law states that attention must be paid to issues of multilingualism, cultural diversity and interculturalism, and language rights throughout schooling (García and Velasco 2012).

The Zapatista movement thus paved the way for the development of Tsetlal and Tsotsil as languages to be used in intercultural bilingual education in schools for indigenous communities in Chiapas. An alphabet was established and a written standard developed. In 2001, the general coordination of Bilingual and Intercultural Education (CGEIB) and the General Directive of Indigenous Education were finally established. A transitional bilingual education policy was developed by the CGEIB to be used in all indigenous schools. During the first cycle of primary education (first and second grade) the *lengua originaria* (original language) would be used 80 per cent of the time. The second cycle of primary education (third and fourth grade) would use the *lengua originaria* 50 per cent of the time, and Spanish the other 50 per cent. Finally, in the third advanced cycle (fifth and sixth grade), 80 per cent of the time would be devoted to Spanish with the indigenous language used only 20 per cent of the time (personal communication, S. Schmelkes, 25 April 2010). Thus, the governmental management policy remains lukewarm at best toward the maintenance and development of indigenous ethnolinguistic identities.

The claim of the indigenous communities, as the Zapatista revolution made clear, was for the ability to construct sociopolitical and socioeconomic success while affirming their indigenous identities as Mexican citizens, and for using their indigenous languages, *alongside* Spanish, to do so. It is important to then note that their demand was not simply for support of Tsetlal/Tsotsil, but for support of the development of a *bilingual* ethnolinguistic identity in Tsetlal or Tsotsil *and* Spanish so that they could be structurally incorporated in the political and economic life of Mexico, and participate in local indigenous life. Stronger language management policies on behalf of Tsetlal and Tsotsil by the Mexican government and the Chiapas central government are needed. But much more is needed than just corpus and status planning on behalf of the indigenous languages of Chiapas.

Taking intercultural bilingual education as an example, we can see how language management by the central state is insufficient to make up for years of neglect of the Tsetlal and Tsotsil communities. Most schools in Tsetlal and Tsotsil communities are primary schools with dirt floors, constructed of wood planks that let in the elements. Usually there are multi-grade classrooms with one to two teachers in a school. The Mexican Ministry of Education (*Secretaría de Educación Pública*, SEP) has published a Basic and an Intermediate reader in Tsetlal and Tsotsil, but the indigenous teachers have received little training on how to teach literacy in these languages. Furthermore, the indigenous teachers themselves

are insecure in their use of written Tselal and Tsotsil since they were schooled in Spanish. Although they are fluent speakers of Tselal and Tsotsil, sometimes they are not fluent speakers of Spanish, having learned Spanish as adults when they left their communities. Many of the indigenous teachers only have had a primary education in Spanish. Although the indigenous children speak only Tselal and Tsotsil in the first and second grades. Their books are for Spanish speakers. The present education system fails to give these indigenous children the education in Spanish they need to become bilingual, and the education in Tselal-Tsotsil that would ensure their strong ethnolinguistic identity and further participation in their local communities.

The other fiasco of the intercultural bilingual education policy has to do with the failure to change perceptions of other Mexicans towards their indigenous peoples. Although the policy was meant to include all Mexican children ('intercultural'), it remains localized in the indigenous communities. In Chiapas, a Tselal/Tsotsil identity continues to be associated with poverty and backwardness. As long as this is so, speakers of Tselal and Tsotsil will continue to shift toward Spanish.

The case of Gallo: language shift

Brittany has two regional languages – Gallo and Breton. Although Breton is a Celtic language, Gallo is a Romance language and is closely related to standard French. Two issues make Gallo's prospects difficult. On the one hand, the French central government authorities have refused to accept Gallo as a regional language of French, and consider it merely a dialect of standard French. On the other hand, many Breton activists see Gallo as competing with what they consider to be the 'true' language of Breton identity – Breton (Hornsby and Nolan 2011).

Activism on behalf of Gallo is very recent and has focused on promoting Gallo as a *bona fide* language. Some success has been achieved. Gallo has been recently elevated in political discourse from being a local language form ('*parler*') to that of language ('*langue*') (Hornsby and Nolan 2011). Although Gallo is presently included as an optional school subject, in the 2008–2009 school year, there were only 1,400 students of Gallo in primary schools, 226 in lower secondary school, and 233 in high school (Hornsby and Nolan 2011).

Although much effort has been expended in developing a standard orthography for Gallo, there is no commonly agreed written standard. Those who favour distancing Gallo from French have developed one type of orthography. The competing one is closer to French and is favoured by teachers.

Despite all the local efforts on behalf of Gallo, only approximately 200,000 people, or 5 to 10 per cent of the Breton population, speak Gallo, and twice as many understand it. UNESCO has recently declared it to be

'severely endangered' (Moseley 2009). Clearly the weak language management efforts on behalf of Gallo both by the Breton community itself, as well as French official policy, puts Gallo in a powerless position. On the other hand, the fact that a Breton ethnolinguistic identity has a controversial and delicate link to Gallo has weakened Gallo language beliefs and practices, rendering useless all language management decisions. Gallo today is extremely threatened as speakers continue to shift to standard French.

Conclusion

The relationship between ethnolinguistic identity and language policy is neither linear nor neutral. As we have seen, there is a dynamic interaction between the two. But the interaction is constructed through participation in different political economies that in turn produce diverse language ideologies. Thus the model that we propose acknowledges the relationship between ethnolinguistic identity and language policy, while emphasizing the constructive aspects of the relationship and its performativity within a specific social context. At the same time, the model makes clear that the constructions and performances are not merely neutral acts, but are conditioned by power dynamics involved in the act of languaging and ethnifying.

Not all constructions and performances of languaging and ethnifying are successful. Some are more successful than others in aligning the wishes of a group in ethnifying through certain languaging, with their own language beliefs and language management, and those of others. In the twenty-first century, as global practices and local practices interact, ways of ethnifying and languaging are becoming complex, with plurilingual/pluricultural and hybrid practices at the centre of acts of identity. But unless those plurilingual and hybrid language practices are accompanied with some measure of political and economic power, practices that are not considered 'standard' by the powerful group will continue to be stigmatized, leading to language insecurity. And unless some features and behaviours of the group's languaging coincide with those in power, language shift in favour of the more prestigious language practices is bound to occur. Language policies must work to improve the meaningful and equitable participation of groups in the life of society, thus guaranteeing the agency of people to act on their own ethnifying and languaging.